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Introduction. 
 Multidimensionality of poverty defies a neat demarcation. Often several but not 
separable meanings can be attributed to poverty which essentially should encompass totality 
of deprivation experienced by an individual or group of individuals. Encyclopedia of social 
sciences for instances suggests that definition of poverty is convention specific and 
distinguishes between Social Poverty and Pauperism. The former includes economic inequality 
or property incomes etc in addition to social inequality such as dependence or exploitation 
while Pauperism denotes ones inability to maintain at the level conventionally regarded as 
minimal.       
  Pauperism has been the focus of researchers and policy makers in the developing 
world wherein efforts have been made to quantify the poverty, thus defined, using essentially 
arbitrary poverty lines or norms with application of varying procedures for estimation. Planning 
Commission of Pakistan suggested an official  poverty line in terms of minimum caloric 
requirement per adult (2350 per day) and the needed expenditure  of Rs. 670 per person for 
1998/99 which was changed for subsequent years taking into account the changes in the price 
level. Not only the caloric intake level  is different than what has been used by other 
researchers    but the procedures  used to estimate  poverty levels also vary, using essentially 
the same data source  (HIES) House hold Income and Expenditure Survey. Obviously the 
poverty lines constructed vary with the caloric intake needed, their conversion into expenditure 
and estimated nonfood expenditure. In contrast to this so-called revealed preference a 
normative approach is also opted,  wherein money value of bundle of commodities regarded 
as minimum acceptable level of living is used as a surrogate of poverty line. These include 
food, clothing, housing, health, education, transport, social interaction and recreation facilities. 
Because of varying poverty lines and procedures to estimate the poverty it is extremely difficult 
to arrive at firm data for a point of time or time trend. 
 
Poverty  Over the Years 
       There is ,however, almost a consensus that in an historical perspective Pakistan was 
successful in reducing poverty over the decades since independence. Absolute poverty, Head 
Count ratio based on caloric intake, declined from 46.5% in 1969/70 to 17% in 1987/88. Since 
then the reversal has taken place till 2001 when it rose to 34 percent.  Most recent research 
exercises for the period since 2002 are suggestive of   improvement, according to the 
 4 
Government – around 10% point  decline in poverty incidence, which is contested by independent 
researchers     including  the WB which claim that poverty  level may have declined from 34 
in2001  to 29 % in 
2004/05.  It is extremely difficult  to offer a firm conclusion about the poverty levels in Pakistan but 
the official claim of 10% point decline during the three years period must be supported by other 
indicators such as real wages, the inequality and unemployment rates. In the absence of 
meticulous research the general impression is that these variables do not support  
the official  position. 
GDP  Growth and Poverty 
Admittedly, overall economic growth has a direct bearing on poverty level in a country, however, 
Pakistan’s experience reflects a dissonance between these two for  some  periods during the past 
sixty years.  For example, high growth period of 1960s is associated with a decline in poverty only 
in urban areas. In rural areas, the poverty situation worsened. During the next decade, GDP 
growth rate was lower than the previous one but level of poverty declined. During 1980s, one 
finds a straightforward and expected relationship between GDP growth rate and poverty wherein 
the poverty  situation  improved while the economy registered a remarkable growth rate. During 
the  1990s the poverty situation worsened ,being 24.9% in 1992/3 to 32.1 in2001, because of low  
and erratic growth profile. The decline in GDP growth continued till 2003, a period  associated 
with strict implementation  of Stabilization  and Structural Adjustment Program. Since 2003 the 
economy appears to have  a turn around by registering  around 6% GDP growth rate during the 
past five years. 
 A perusal of research studies conducted over the years reflects that in addition to growth 
there are some important determinant of poverty situation. For instance, high growth rate of 
1960s failed to reflect any improvement in the poverty situation in rural areas because of the 
eviction of tenants and rise in landlessness [Irfan and Amjad (1984)].  In the wake of subdued 
economic performance of the early 1970s, a decline in the poverty level was made possible 
through escalation in the public sector employment and a massive rise in public sector 
expenditure [Zaidi (1995)]. Similarly, Middle East emigration and return flow of remittances  
had a positive influence on GDP growth as well as poverty till late 1980s.  In other words, 
Pakistan’s experience suggests a very close link between employment generation, remittances 
and tight labour market and poverty. 
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 The slippage of the economy into debt trap around late 1980s and reduction in the foreign 
aid, in fact put a halt to the past practices wherein the entire development expenditure and 
occasionally the current expenditure used to be financed by internal and external borrowing. To 
the extent the improvement in poverty situation during 1970 & 1980’s occurred because of the 
policies and measures resulting in huge budget deficits and mounting indebtedness, these 
represent inter-generational poverty shift, wherein future generations have to pay back what was 
borrowed for sustaining as well as inflating the consumption level of current generation. . In order 
to rectify the internal and external imbalances through curtailing expenditure, raising revenues 
and better export performance under IMF/World Bank reform packages, the economy was 
subjected to a discipline. Pakistan agreed to implement various structural adjustment and 
stabilization programs.  It is in this context that four programs beginning with 1987-88 were 
signed by the Government of Pakistan for implementation. With the exception of the last 1999-
2003, there were implementation lapses though. Pakistan has been successful in attaining 
macroeconomic stability by implementing SAP  during 1999 to 2003 at the cost of subdued 
economic performance  squeeze of the development expenditure  and worsening poverty.  
. The deterioration of the poverty conditions in the country in the context of Structural 
Adjustment Programs during the first five years of the current regime   was due to  a number of 
factors which  explain poor economic performance as well as worsening poverty situation in 
the country till 2003.. For instance, decline in the GDP growth rate has been attributed to low 
level of investment and lack of effective demand occasioned by the squeeze entailed by 
massive reduction in the public sector expenditure to address the problem of budget deficit. 
Furthermore the failure of the state to bring  the rich into tax net rendered the taxation structure 
regressive wherein the poor were subjected to a disproportionate burden. Similarly, the 
withdrawal of input subsidies in agriculture sector along with provision of international prices to 
producers benefited only those who had marketed surplus in the agriculture sector which 
explains the failure of respectable growth in agriculture during 1990s to have a positive 
influence on the poverty in rural areas. The conjunctive influence of tariff rationalization, 
financial sector reform and privatization led to closure of factories and downsizing which in turn 
resulted into substantial job losses. It may be added that poverty related expenditure of the 
government drastically reduced as a percentage of GDP during  the decade of 1990s till 2003 
thereby crucifying the poor at the alter of macro stabilization. The labour market outcome as 
indexed by rising unemployment rate and stagnant or declining real wages also an offshoot of  
 these measures, further  compounded the situation.   
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 Whilst the above mode of analysis provides explanation for rise in poverty during 
1990’s, there is also a need to disentangle the effect of structural adjustment from the inherent 
limitation of the overall dispensation of the country.  A case in point is that of failure of 
investment to rise, the basic factor which explains low growth. Of course this can be attributed 
to the inconsistency of the policies along with law and order situation but these can not be 
regarded as the off-shoot of the structural adjustment program. Similarly, massive reduction in 
public sector expenditure is more a failure of the state to generate resources because of the 
particular compositional specifics of the society than an effect of the transition of the economy 
under the structural adjustment.  Obviously, there is a need to mount more investigative 
pursuits with a view to understand the given constellation of the power brokers in the country 
and their impact on the poor, through the choices they make. Few if any research endeavour 
has been made to understand the power play and assess the sustainability of the interventions 
through critical scrutiny of their financing mechanism both in case of the Macro or household 
level. Most of the poverty estimates at the level of household exclusively focus on consumption 
expenditure with little investigation of the financing mechanism. This glossing over of survival 
strategy of the poor leads to equate those who have been out of poverty clutches at a point of 
time because of distress sale of their assets or through reckless borrowing resulting into high 
level of indebtedness, with those who have regular and permanent sources of income. This 
argument is equally valid for country level study too, because in general the sustainability of 
pro poor interventions has not been reckoned by researchers. An intriguing  fact of the history 
is that Pakistan was successful in reducing the poverty level  during the periods  when the 
country received massive funds from abroad(1980s and 2000-2006)It is also not coincidence 
that during these periods the country was under the non democratic  dispensation. In other 
words whatever the poverty alleviation   occurred was not indigenous and hardly enmeshed 
with  the dynamics of growth. 
Turnaround of the economy during the recent  sub period(2003-2006)wherein the GDP growth 
of 6% per annum has been registered  may have led to the decline in poverty  and little bit 
unemployment but inequalities not only persisted but increased . Inflow of funds from abroad  
due to geo-political factors and remittances facilitated the government to expand public sector 
spending thereby having positive effect on poverty situation. Short tern prospects of the 
sustainability of the GDP growth are not bright. The  high inflation rate, widening current 
account deficits ,sluggish export performance and reasonably high level of interest rates 
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besides failure of the regime to  increase tax to GDP ratio and national savings are the 
worrisome factors..   
 
Response to poverty 
       Various regimes since independence  have, devised programs to alleviate poverty as a 
byproduct of rural development or employment creation. These were for instance rural 
development programs such as - Village Aid in 1950, Rural Works Program, People Works 
Programs and other similar ventures. Construction of Dams and irrigation networks, and 
provision of social services – education and health etc. were also relied upon for addressing 
the poverty in Pakistan. Asset distribution, the land reforms were implemented twice but the 
reforms were not designed to introduce a radical departure from the erstwhile skewed  land 
distribution. In addition to officialization of Zakat , food rationing and provision of subsidies to 
consumers and small producers were some times also introduced. Mostly these measures  
were believed to be reflective of the visibility concern of various regimes with limited and short 
lived impact wherein poverty alleviation still remains a challenge as discussed in the previous 
section. Under the paradigm of globalization and market imperialism    the power of the state to 
influence the poverty  situation has been curtailed. Unlike the past when the employment 
generation was possible in the public sector ,the current emphasis is on privatization. Workers 
and labour are no more regarded as social partners rather they are just like other factors of 
production. This is manifest from the benign neglect of the current regime towards wage 
legislation, failure to  inject any progressivism  in the taxation structure rather the wealth tax is 
abolished and  land reforms are banished for ever  thereby explicitly making the dispensation 
as pro-rich.   
A number of  programs and initiatives  still are being  undertaken  under the rubric of  Social 
Safety nets  which are essentially reactive and  not sharply focused besides carrying no 
entitlement as a right .A need for clearly defined norms and standards to be attained, the type 
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of risks against which the vulnerable to be protected, and measures identified to address the 
chronic as well as transient poverty  is  yet to be articulated in terms of a social protection  
strategy. Admittedly the Government has designed several instruments with a professed   
objective to help the poorest segments of the population . These include transfers in cash and 
kind for smoothening their consumption and provision of credit through specialized institutions 
for income generation through investment and creation of employment opportunities through 
public works programs, as discussed below.   
Social Safety Nets 
      SSN constitute of cash transfers, Social security schemes  Pensions of the public sector 
employees and some other measures. Cash transfers such as through Zakat, BaitulMaal and 
wheat subsidy can be regarded as safety nets, envisaged to address the  vulnerabilities, In 
addition the  Governmental pensions and social security system administered by Ministry of 
Labour are legally guaranteed, though partially, with heavy tilt towards formal sectors 
employees. Finally measures which carry instrumentalism aiming at employment generation 
through public works and credit programs, having little impact on poverty though much of it 
remains unknown and not quantified. Below a description of the extent and coverage of these 
measures is made. 
 
Zakat  
       Zakat is  levied at the rate of 2.5% on the financial wealth of the rich, in contradistinction to 
the true spirit of the religion which extends the coverage of Zakat to all types of wealth. In 
Pakistan  Zakat is deducted at source by companies on the par value of shares held, and by 
the financial institutions on assets such as saving bank accounts, fixed deposit saving 
certificates, NIT units, ICP’s mutual fund certificates and government securities, etc. Recently, 
under a judgment of the Supreme Court, payment of Zakat has been made voluntary. This 
decision is most likely  to have a curtailing effect on the level of annual Zakat collection. Zakat 
is deposited in the Central Zakat Fund maintained by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The 
Central Zakat Council allocates these funds on the basis of population    to the Provincial Zakat 
Council for onward distribution among the districts, managed by the District Zakat Committees.  
As a percent of the GDP, Zakat was around 0.31 percent in 1980-81, falling to 0.2 percent 
during 1990s and 0.14% since 2000. During this entire period Rs. 74 billion was collected as 
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Zakat and Rs. 59 billion was disbursed. Resultantly, the Central Zakat Fund has Rs. 15 billion 
in reserve. Large reserves of unspent funds prompted the GOP and the Central Zakat Council 
to introduce in 2002 the Permanent Rehabilitation Scheme (PRS). However, it will not be 
possible to carry out these programs once the accumulated reserves have been exhausted, 
because the average annual collection of Zakat has now decreased to below Rs. 4 billion.  
Cash transfers to the poor and disadvantaged under Zakat are through the Guzara Allowance 
(a monthly transfer of Rs.500 - earlier Rs.300 - per recipient to approximately 800,000 
households) and the Permanent Rehabilitation Grant (an average transfer of Rs. 17,000 to 
close to 10,000 households), accounting for   70% of Zakat related disbursements. Other 
Zakat programs include educational stipends, financing of healthcare and marriage assistance 
grants.  
The impact and targeting of Zakat can not be ascertained because it entails verification of 
expenditures with in the district. The HIES 2001-02 reflects that two bottom quintiles, ranked 
on the basis of per capita expenditure, accounted for 57%of the zakat recipient households 
and 40%of total zakat distributed. Average size of zakat is modest compared with the needs of 
the poorest segments of the society. PSES conducted by PIDE in 2001 is suggestive of 
dominant role of District zakat   committee and the local councilors in identification of the 
beneficiary. Favoritism and patronage as well as corruption can hardly be ruled out. According 
to the said survey 31% of the bottom quintile did not receive the full amount of zakat.  
 
      Improvements in the targeting system through some type of proxy means testing to 
sharpen the eligibility criteria  are needed, also  the Central Zakat Council need to be vested   
with the powers to verify provincial and district records.  There is also a need to review the 
Zakat allocation formula on the basis of provincial and district populations which should be 
based on the levels of poverty as experienced by different areas. In view of the much smaller 
base of annual inflows of Rs. 3.7 billion, the PRS program    under Zakat will most likely have 
to be shelved. Besides, its impact and the quality of the targeting cannot be ascertained, 
because of lack of information.   
 
Bait-ul-Maal 
       The Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal (PBM) funded by grants from Federal Budget, to help the 
needy, runs a number of programs, the main ones being the Food Support Program (FSP) and 
Individual Financial Assistance (IFA).  Food Support Program (FSP) was launched in August 
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2000, with an annual budget grant of Rs. 2.5 billion to be distributed as a  cash transfer of Rs. 
2,400 per annum, in two installments of Rs. 1,200 each, to 1.25 million households. This 
represents an additional income of 4% for households living on the poverty line. Provincial and 
district-wise allocations of FSP funds reportedly are on the basis of the distribution of poor 
households using the national poverty profile by province and urban/rural locations derived 
from the HIES. The eligibility of the applicant is not assessed rigorously, with inclusion in the 
program essentially being an administrative decision. It may be noted that the size of the 
transfer under FSP is significantly smaller than the Guzara Allowance of Rs. 500 per month 
per household, although both programs are targeting similar groups of the poor. 
There are a number of programs under Individual Financial Assistance (IFA); the total 
allocation of Rs. 229 million in FY04 benefited 20,000 households. The IFA is distributed 
among the provinces on the basis of population with no further formal allocation to districts.  
Thus there are large disparities among districts in the number of recipients benefiting from the 
transfers. Selection of beneficiaries and violation of eligibility criteria are also major concerns in 
this context.    
 
Wheat Subsidy 
       Atta subsidy in budgetary allocations partly  represents  subsidy  to poor   because the  
bulk of the cost of the activities related to wheat operations also includes expenditures on  
bagging, handling, storage and stock carrying costs. Thus one can not infer  effect of Atta 
subsidy on level of poverty. Moreover, the subsidy also increases with higher inefficiency and 
increase in administration costs. If one uses the revised poverty line of Rs.849 per adult 
equivalent per month, the economic subsidy for 2004 works out to less than 5% of the poverty 
line, and around 8% for households earning Rs.2,500 per month. Therefore, the benefit to the 
consumer is little. One estimate however suggests that if the entire allocation on the subsidy, 
Rs.16.8 billion (which include the allocations for the wheat subsidy and the Food Support 
Program of the Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal) were distributed among the 15% most vulnerable 
households. It would be sufficient to meet their wheat consumption requirements for close to 
six and a half months.  
In contrast to above mentioned cash transfers aiming to address the poverty problem, the 
social security schemes   discussed below are designed to benefit the formal sector 
employees irrespective of the poverty status of the beneficiary besides being legally 
guaranteed. 
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Pensions for Government Employees 
       Permanently employed government servants of the federal or the provincial governments 
receive pension and other benefits under the laws of their respective governments, covered 
under the Government Servants Pension Funds Scheme. The government servants are 
entitled to receive pension and other benefits such as provident fund, on retirement, at the age 
of 60 or earlier after 25 years of pensionable service. Government servants who have worked 
for less than 25 years are not entitled to receive pension. Also the contract employees of the 
government are not entitled to any social benefits. It is noteworthy that much of the new 
recruitment during the recent period in government is on contract though with better salary 
package than the previous regular government employees. It may be added that government 
pension scheme is unfunded and pensions constituted 30% of total salary in 1996 budget. 
Pensions are fixed according to the length of the service and because of non-indexation of the 
pensions as used to be the case under cost f Living Relief Act of 1973 the inflations erodes 
their real content overtime, thereby passing substantial number of pensioners below poverty 
line. 
 
Employees Old Age Benefit Institution 
        EOBI established under Employees Old-age Benefit Act. 1976. administers the only 
national pension scheme for employees in private sector industries/establishments with at 
least ten employees, excluding those in managerial and professional categories and directors. 
EOBI, a corporate body gets policy guidance from a Tripartite Board of Trustees, with 
Secretary Labour as its Chairman, four representatives from the Federal Government, four 
provincial Labour Secretaries, four provincial representatives of employers, and four provincial 
representatives of workers, and the Director General EOBI. According to the existing rules, 
employers pay mandatory contributions of 5% of the first Rs. 3,000 of employee’s wages per 
month. The government had been contributing an equivalent matching grant until July 1995, 
but it withdrew thereafter. Old age pensions accrue at the rate of 2% of the final year wage 
(maximum of Rs. 3,000 p.m.), subject to a minimum of Rs. 630 p.m. (recently increased to Rs. 
1000 p.m). Survivor’s pension (for spouses on death after retirement and on death in service 
after 36 months of coverage), invalidity pension, and old-age grants are also provided. These 
benefits are portable only between covered establishments, thus depriving many workers of 
their rights if they moved out of the covered establishments a widespread phenomenon under 
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downsizing and privatization... Normally workers become eligible to draw pension after 
reaching the age of 60 years (55 years for females) provided they complete 15 years as 
covered service. 
At the end of year 2000, the EOBI had 43,560 employers, 1,572,014 insured persons and 
181,547 pensioners on its register. EOBI, coverage is simply inadequate and only a minor 
fraction of total wage employees in the country. The number of beneficiaries is only a small 
proportion of the covered workers (10.4%), although this number is growing at a much faster 
rate (19.3% p.a) than the growth rate of the number of person entering the scheme (7.3% p.a)  
This slow growth is due to employer’s evasion of paying contribution as well as low 
employment growth in formal sector. However, this generates a sustainability problem for 
EOBI because benefit outgo is higher than the increments in contribution. According to some 
estimates the Fund will start decreasing in next 20 years and get depleted in just a few more 
years under unchanging conditions. This un-sustainability has been pointed out by many 
actuarial assessments. 
 Sharp growth in EOBI’s administrative expenditures is quite noticeable. These expenditures 
(4.9% of total receipts and 20.7% of contributions in 2000) are much higher than similar 
institutions in other countries, and are growing rapidly (19.3%) p.m. in 1997-2000). These high 
establishment costs would exert downward pressure on the benefit level. The system is 
managed poorly and reportedly suffers from several governance and administrative problems. 
Procedures for monitoring of payments, filing of returns and assessment, and resolution of 
disputes are cumbersome. There are numerous complaints from employers and employees 
against harassment at the hands of the EOBI staff. Records are alleged to be poorly 
maintained and there is a lot of evasion and manipulation.  
 Finally pensions are not indexed and erode quickly due to inflation. The government has at 
times attempted to partially relieve this hardship by raising the minimum pension. But this relief 
has not been enough and even the minimum pensions have lost one thirds of their value in last 
15 years. The erosion produces un-predictable effect on pensions, creates inequities between 
different age cohorts, and diminishes the effectiveness of the plan. 
 
Employee Social Security Institutions 
       The Employees Social Security Institutions (ESSIs) have been established to provide 
benefits to employees (with salaries below the specified threshold) in the event of sickness, 
maternity, disability or employment injury. Provincial ESSIs cover all establishments 
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notified/registered by the Social Security Institution (irrespective of the size of the 
establishment in terms of numbers of workers, asset base, etc.). Until recently the employers 
paid contributions at the rate of 7% of wage of their permanent employees earning a gross 
salary of a maximum of Rs. 5,000 per month.  
From July 1, 2001 an employer can opt for a self-assessment scheme under which he is liable 
to pay a flat rate, lump sum, contribution of Rs. 350 rupees per month per secured employee 
on the books of the company on June 30, 2001, while the Government of Punjab instituted a 
new system in 2003 under which organizations are required to pay contributions based on a 
slab system. The affairs of ESSIs are managed by provincial governing bodies comprising 
representatives of the provincial government and of employers and employees. 
Representatives of employers and employees are selected by the government. Currently, 
close to 534,000 workers are registered with the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution 
(PESSI) and an estimated 310,000 with its counterpart in Sindh. 
 A number of hospitals, dispensaries and other medical facilities for medical treatment of 
secured workers has been set up by ESSI..The location of these facilities hardly synchronizes 
with the dispersion or spread of the industrial or secured workers.  Irrespective of the 
duplication wherein these facilities co-exist along the general system the quality of services 
provided through these institutions Is regarded to be poor both by workers and employers.. 
While the expenditure on medicines per person covered (including workers’ dependents) is 
roughly Rs. 59, administrative expenditure   works out to a substantive Rs. 58 per person 
covered, indicating the high costs and low efficiency of delivering health services to workers 
through the SSI of PUNJAB. Similarly, the difference between income per worker and the 
medical expenditure estimated on the basis of workers secured is attributed to the high 
administrative costs (Rs. 149.9 million-nearly Rs.480 per secured worker spent by the 
organization in Sindh..  
The coverage of Essi is limited because of widespread contract employment in the formal 
sector, only a small proportion of the workforce. Currently around 0.8 million workers are 
enrolled with ESSI. Concerns are also expressed on the implementation of the eligibility 
criteria, the transparency of the decision making processes and overall functioning of worker 
welfare schemes which are reflective of poor governance. Worker welfare organizations are 
involved in a host of activities including the provision of cash benefits, health and education 
services. Not only is there an overlap between programs run by the WWF and the ESSIs (for 
instance both these organizations have established health facilities), these services are also 
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provided through the government’s service delivery systems. Although the poor quality of 
services delivered through government service outlets are used as a justification of their 
duplication by the labour welfare organizations, these organizations do not have adequate 
capacity to effectively undertake these activities; these functions can not be regarded as their 
core competency. 
 
Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) 
        The Workers Welfare Fund established in 1971 is managed by a tripartite body 
comprising government officials and representatives of employers and employees. The 
identification, planning, and execution of projects is carried out by the Provincial Workers 
Welfare Boards (PWWBs) 
Although the Fund’s receipts are collected federally, the bulk of the operations are undertaken 
by the PWWBs, which can be broadly categorized into housing construction activities, schools 
and health service outlets and funds/commodities distributed directly to eligible workers 
(including marriage grants, death grants, sewing machines, bicycles and scholarships for 
worker’s children). 
The Fund has an accumulated amount of close to Rs. 6 billion in investment and over Rs. 11 
billion lying with the Finance Ministry. It may be noted that the Workers Welfare Fund is 
collected by the CBR and a large amount of resources are lying with the Federal government 
and the Fund does not receive any benefit or interest on that amount. The receipts of WWF 
(2% of the levy and left over amount under Workers Profit Participation Scheme) in the first 
instance forrm part of Federal Consolidated Fund subsequently these are transferred to 
Reserve Funds of WWF by debiting to the budget Grant of Ministry of Labour. 
At the federal level, the Fund is theoretically run by a tri-partite governing body, but in practice 
the Federal government controls it. The Fund has, therefore, in general, not been administered 
according to its mandate; successive governments have used it for outlandish projects such as 
the Kidney Centers etc. The structural problems such as the relationship between the Fund 
and the Boards have led to widespread misuse and misappropriation of funds on the one hand 
and an extremely inefficient allocation of resources, especially in the housing sector on the 
other.   
      Quite apart from the problems listed above, the overall performance of the Fund in its 
major area of activity, the housing sector has been totally unsatisfactory. For example in its 30 
years of operations only 20 thousands houses flats, have been built at the cost of RS 5 Billion 
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providing only for 0.4% of industrial labour force. It has over the same period developed 35175 
plots (1758/year). Only 44860 workers or 1.1% of those employed in the manufacturing and 
mining sectors have benefited from the three decade long endeavors. There are serious 
complaints as to the manner in which the house/flats and plots have been allotted. There are 
also questions about the legibility of the beneficiaries in most cases. In the area of “other 
welfare measures” as well, the Fund seems to have been wandering into all kind of activities 
most of which are regarded to be dubious and many duplicating the functions of other 
institutions such as the ESSIs, Mine Workers Welfare. 
The construction of houses/flats and new schools   may be  discontinued and schools already 
constructed and run by the Boards should either be handed over to the provincial education 
department or to the respective district governments. Existing programs of educational 
scholarships may be continued and supplemented by educational vouchers that can be used 
in privately managed educational institutions. Also there is a need to launch major training 
programs for the unemployed youth with the collaboration of private sector utilizing the funds of 
WWF.   
 
Micro Credit 
      Khushhali Bank (KB) and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) constitutes as the 
major government’s micro-finance initiatives to reduce poverty, however the likely exclusion of 
very poor, permanently  disabled or incapacitated  from these credit  schemes render these 
initiatives as instruments for employment generation if effectively utilized , a big if any way. 
These ventures can hardly be qualified as safety net. Information on lending rates and cost of 
funds in case of Khushhali Bank is simply not available, however total outstanding loans from 
KB amounted to Rs 1.06 Billion by June 2004, three-fourth of which was reported to be lent for 
agriculture and live stock. Administrative cost of the KB appears to be on the high side as its 
financial statement for the year ending 2002 reflects that interest earning from lending 
operations net of cost of borrowing failed to cover the administrative cost.  
 
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
      PPAF was established to extend the access of poor and micro enterprises to credit 
facilities. The World Bank provided a loan of US $ 90 million and an equivalent amount of 
grant, the former for disbursement as a credit and the latter for infra-structure build up of PPAF 
and related organizations. The PPAF was established as a joint stock company outside the 
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Governmental influence, presumably to avoid its discretionary powers. The Board of Directors 
of PPAF which provides policy guidelines comprises of three members from the government 
and the remaining nine from the civil society.  
PPAF acts as wholesaler and distributes credit through the sister organizations (NGO). While 
the provision of credit to poor without any subsidy (often reflected through lower interest rates) 
is understandable, the appropriation of spread between the borrowing rate (at 2%) and 
ultimate lending rate (20-22%) hardly appears to be justifiable.  PPAF and sister organization 
enjoy this reward simply for organizing CBOs in the villages .The objective of arranging a 
social collateral through CBO could have been achieved at much lower cost through 
cooperative credit societies under the administrative control of the Provincial governments. 
The spread would have been used to build up their reserve fund, which in turn would have 
ensured sustainability to the venture, currently missing under PPAF. 
The coverage of PP AF is currently limited, compared to the needs. That it did not so far had a 
significant impact on poverty alleviation in the areas of its operation appears to be supported 
by a study conducted by Gallup. Almost 60% of those surveyed did not experience any 
increase in their income. PPAF was established because of the encouraging experience of 
micro-enterprises loan of the World Bank distributed through Banker’s Equity Limited wherein 
loan was extended to successful ongoing enterprises. The extent to which PPAF can achieve 
such a primacy is difficult to determine. Micro credit is not generally targeted to the poor. 
However increased access to credit facilities for those with out collateral can serve as a 
powerful instrument for income generation and poverty alleviation, if lending rates are not 
inordinately high and entrepreneurial training is also included in the package. It may be of 
interest to note that the    partner organizations of PPAF have not been able to cover all costs 
from interest income despite high interest rate charged from the borrowers. 
 
Public Works Programs 
        There is a long history of the public works program in Pakistan. However rarely any 
evaluative study has ever been undertaken to document the totality of impact of a program for 
poverty alleviation or employment generation. This simply is reflective of the level of concern of 
policy maker with respect to efficient use of resources. Incidentally it also exhibits the efforts to 
cover up the effects of politicization and misgovernance. Targeting efficiency of these 
programs involve firstly to identify the poverty stricken areas. Geographic or regional incidence 
of poverty, however, based on HIES or PIHS produces inconsistent results. The provincial 
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ranking using head count ratio fluctuates from year to year. Once project site is selected the 
participation of poor in construction work is ensured by keeping wages lower than the 
prevailing market rate. Hardly any information pertaining to wage rates paid to different 
categories of workers is available to determine the applicability of the above cited self 
targeting. That public works program in the past have been politicized with attendant 
misgovernance and sub-optimal use of resources appears to be a foregone conclusion. 
However, these programs constitute as one of the major interventions for rural development, 
employment generation and poverty alleviation. The challenge therefore is to strengthen the 
institutional structure and ensure better governance. In addition there is a need to allocate 
sufficient funds for maintenance of infra-structure to reap benefits from the past investments. 
Major initiatives in the construction of new facility holding out potentials for kickback and 
constituency fortification have to be resisted.   
This is not to deny the immense potentials of the public works programs like Khushal Pakistan 
or Tameer-e-Pakistan Programme but their impact on employment generation both direct as 
well as indirect and poverty alleviation depends on host of factors mentioned above. In addition 
it may be kept in view that translation of employment into poverty alleviation is strictly a 
function of wages which are currently depressed.  
Given the dominant role of public works program in the PRSP the existing pattern of 
distribution of funds on the basis of provincial or federal parliament’s constituencies have to be 
re-examined because poverty is unevenly spread across the country. In addition the 
employment generation has to qualify as decent work, better wages, and working conditions 
and permission of social dialogue. 
 
Overview of Social Safety Net Programs. 
      In general the SSN   suffer from the inadequate coverage due to low level of funding. 
Multiplicity of actors with little co-ordination resulting in duplicity of functions as well as of 
beneficiaries and widely pervasive problems of leakages and misgovernance further dilute the 
impact of various measures. According to a recent study the  allocations for selected safety 
nets Zakat and Baitulmaal,  the latter being financed through the budget, have only increased 
moderately as a proportion of GDP, from 0.19% in 2001-02 to close to 0.3% in 2003-04 
(including off-budget zakat contributions the total expenditure amounts to under 0.5% of GDP).  
Together these programs reach a relatively small number of households, less than 35%, of the 
total 7 million poor households. The limited impact  of measures  under labor welfare schemes 
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of the Workers Welfare Fund and Social Security Institutions designed for employees in the 
formal sector1 is  reflected  by  a mere 4%  coverage of the non-agricultural workforce.. 
The limited extent to which these measures influence the poverty and vulnerabilities is 
manifest from the table below: 
Table 1: Budgetary Contribution (Rs. in Billion) and Number of Beneficiary 
Households (‘000s) 
 
Type of Program 2001/02 2002/03 
2003/04 
(Budget) 
No. of 
Beneficiary 
HHs (000s) 
Wheat/Atta Subsidy 5.50 10.90 13.30 Univ. subsidy 
Bait-ul-Maal:        
 Food Support Program 2.00 2.20 3.50 1,132 
 Tawana Pakistan 0.80 0.60 0.70 530 
 Low Cost Housing 0.00 0.10 0.20 N/A 
 Others (IFA, etc.) 0.15 0.15 0.23 20 
Total: 8.45 13.95 17.90 1,682 
Percent of Total Govt. 
Exp. 
1.02 1.55 1.87  
Percent of 
GDP/Population: 
0.19 0.29 0.32 7.5 
 
Table 2: Off-Budget (Rs. in Million) and Number of Beneficiary Households (‘000s) 
 
Type of Social Protection 2001/02 No. of Beneficiaries 
Zakat (Annual Flow now Rs. 3.8 billion) 5,583 1,733 
Workers’ Welfare Fund 2,600  
Employees’ Social Security Institution 1,739 850 
 
Source: Pakistan Review of Selected Social Safety Net Programs.  
Issues and Policies Consultants Lahore Pakistan, November 2004. 
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The above simply is reflective of the very low level of effort and resources utilized to reckon 
with the poverty of one thirds of the population of the country. Even these paltry outlays are not 
fully utilized effectively because of leakages and constituency built up by the actors at the 
helms of affairs..    
   
Social Protection – Is It a mission impossible? 
 
      Founding father of Pakistani nation always emphasized the importance of justice as a 
cardinal principle in Pakistan. “There are millions of our people who hardly get one meal a day. 
Is this civilization? Do you visualize that millions have been exploited and can not get one meal 
a day. If this is the idea of Pakistan I would not have it” Quaid-i-Azam in annual session of 
Muslim League in 1943 meeting clearly affirmed his pro-poor agenda Tahir (1999). Needless 
to mention that successive regimes since independence could not live up to the expectations 
of the founding father. A renewed commitment was made in 1973 wherein social security as an 
explicit right of an individual was laid down in the Constitution under article 38 which reads as 
under: 
 
provide for all persons employed in the service of Pakistan or 
otherwise, social security by compulsory social insurance or other 
means; provide basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, 
housing, education and medical relief, for all such citizens, 
irrespective of sex, creed, caste, or race, as are permanently or 
temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, 
sickness or unemployment; reduce disparity in the income and 
earnings of individuals. Article 38 (d) and (e).Constitution of Pakistan. 
 
 A closer scrutiny of the development policies pursued during the past six decade since 
independence, hardly suggests that an explicit pro-poor agenda was ever implemented despite 
such objectives being reflected in various policy documents and Five Year Plans. This tension 
between words and deeds could be attributed to various factors. Underdevelopment and lack 
of financial resources to opt for a generalized social security system, a characteristic of welfare 
state,  have always been cited as a major  one by the official and policy makers. Pervasive 
family based enterprise system and self-employment has been identified as a surrogate of 
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social protection as well as an hindrance to introducing one by the state. A general perception 
that families, tribes and communities take care of the poor members was also used to justify 
limited initiatives by state. At the same time one fails to find a sustained mass movement of 
poor or labourers demanding exclusive pro-poor development strategy. This was presumably 
because of accommodative value system of the people, an interactive outcome of culture, 
religion and centuries old domination by foreign powers, and tight grip of those at the helm of 
affairs. Finally it is also believed that the coalition of policy and decision makers in Pakistan 
prefers to retain paternalism and dependency which explains their reluctance to introduce any 
measures which was right based such as, the generalized social security or social protection. 
       Social protection is often used interchangeably  with social security  and social safety nets, 
though all three differ  both analytically and in terns of implications. The existing Social security  
is attributable to ILOs convention of 1952, addresses three essential features –income 
protection, health provision and child related benefits. But it is confined to public sector 
employees and to part of the formal sector workers while the remaining majority is  excluded. It 
is however right based. Social safety nets on the other hand entail instruments to alleviate 
poverty. Besides through the implementation of SSN acceptability of market reforms and 
changes are supposed to be enhanced  as these  are envisaged to address the casualties of 
growth under the globalization .Social protection is a right based approach and carries the 
notion of public provisioning and guarantees  a societally acceptable standards of living to all. 
      
      Despite the constitutional guarantees  policy makers and planners never tried to make any 
move from the existing pittance  dished out under  the SSN towards the social protection .Even 
the Social security  for workers is getting less and less relevant, wage legislation is almost 
discarded. There is a need to examine the root causes of poverty and deprivation which are 
intimately related with the power structure  and the resultant control mechanism of the society 
rendering the poor totally asset less and voiceless. .The relations between poverty and politics  
need to be understood. Collective action of the community  and mobilization of the poor are 
prerequisites for empowerment of the poor. What needed is a coalition of the stake holders 
supporting the poor. Can the poor of Pakistan expect a public pressure to this effect  from civil 
society and  some political leaders? The  ground realities  of Pakistan, however do not inspire 
confidence that  such a move can be had in near future. Needless to mention that the provision 
 of  so called social protection   in Pakistan is moving away from social protection as a right to 
have a more reliance on private sector and market based approaches. This is despite the fact 
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that the official documents such as MTDF, PRSP and Five Year  Plans, recognize the 
importance of right based approach towards provisioning of the social protection but in actual 
delivery  the measures are confined to SSN which are regarded as “ different ways of viewing  
essentially the same set of measures” thereby construing these as Pakistans Social protection 
strategy. Below  some recommendations to improve the existing system, which is far from the 
desirable one ,are made 
Recommendations 
The SSn currently are inadequate in coverage, without a sharp and well defined focus, 
fuzzy targeting, and multiplicity of actors and shorn of a sound   monitoring and evaluation 
system. In order to improve the situation the following measures are suggested for 
consideration. 
I. Formulate a social protection strategy with well defined objectives in terms of indicators 
and targets to be achieved and monitored. 
II. A substantial increase in the governmental outlays through increased budgetary 
allocation for BaitulMaal ,matching grants in case of Zakat which is experiencing a 
downward trend and wheat subsidy along with build up of strategic wheat reserves 
appears a desirable step, the poverty gap needs to be kept in view while allocations are 
being made. Currently a minor fraction is available compared to needs. New avenues of  
taxes such as inheritance tax in addition to agriculture income tax  explored for ensuring 
funds for poverty alleviation and promotion of equity in the country. 
 
 
III. Inter- agency coordination through development of synergies is imperative to eradicate 
the duplication of functions as well as double payment to some beneficiaries from 
different sources. The core competencies of the agencies need to be aligned with their 
functions; in particular the organizations under the Ministry of Labour have to be 
examined which tend to undertake all the activities under the sun, but failed to extend 
the coverage of the social security  and let the dispensation to throw Cost of Living 
Relief Act 1973 in the dust bin and could not mount the confidence to formulate a just  
minimum wage legislation.      
IV. Development of a centralized data base containing the names and addresses of 
beneficiaries along with the size of benefits from all the programs in the country to be 
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used also as a monitoring device. In addition field surveys must be mounted to assess 
the transparency, and adherence to prescribed eligibility criteria.  
V. Targeting mechanisms  can be improved by identification and selection of, beneficiaries 
for different program benefits on the basis of proxy means tests (by collecting 
information on wealth, property owned, condition of housing, occupation, locality in 
which living, widows, orphans, disabled, durables owned, number of earners and 
dependents etc.)Community participation in the distribution of benefits would improve 
both transparency and targeting of safety net programs. 
VI. Monitoring and evaluation needs to be improved by introduction of Third Party 
Validation and internal reviews which should be made public. 
VII. Governing body approach to administer different organization, particularly in the Labour 
Ministry, tended to degenerate into monoliths. Broad based GB by making these more 
representative possibly through induction of persons from civil society  is needed.  
VIII. The  infrastructure development programs are likely to be the major initiatives in the 
 PRSP. The site selection, the type of project implemented need to have a close 
relationship with the varying level of poverty across the country. The current allocations 
on the basis of Provincial or Federal parliament members may ensure the party loyality, 
has to be tempered with poverty concerns. In addition there is a need to prioritize the 
projects on the basis of both direct and indirect employment effects. 
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